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Abstract
The paper describes the key features of functioning of the post-communist economies, which determine the specificity, essential
to transmission mechanisms of economic policy. The analysis reveals existing significant influence of institutional factors on the
efficiency of fiscal policy transmission mechanism in transition economies. The authors prove a heavy dependence of efficiency
of fiscal policy transmission mechanism in Ukrainian economy from institutional factors such as management of government
expenditures, consumers’ expectations and the level of fiscal decentralization.
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1. Introduction
Modern post-communist economies develop under strong globalization pressure, which is attended by increase in
structural interdependence of national economies and integration of their key sectors into ‘interdependent
comprehensive whole, which functions in real time’, as claimed by Castells (2000). These processes exercise a
contradictory influence upon transformations of global and national economies. Thus a necessity to rethink
economic theory and practice is indispensable to the future economic development of transition economies, as well
as to an effective enhancement of economic policy, aimed to support an improved integration of countries into
global economic environment.
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It is essential to take into account the fact that globalization generates considerable threats and risks for post-
communist countries which operate under unfavorable conditions of permanent increase in global economic
instability. Additionally transition economies suffer from accelerated entering into structures of formed
macroeconomic interdependences and interrelations.
Peculiar way of development of the transformation economies is supplemented by:
• Structural reconstruction of national economic systems and destruction of existing productive and commercial
links.
• Strong external economic liberalization which causes more external than internal pressure on national
commodity producers. Thus, possibilities of their rapid adaptation to the global competitive environment are limited.
• Accelerated liberalization of monetary and financial sectors which forms preconditions for capital outflow
from real sector to more flexible monetary and stock sectors.
• Undermining national self-sufficiency in ensuring economic development, reducing capabilities of national
governmental for economic regulation and achieving the goals of commonwealth.
• Expansion of internal and external risks related to the escalating prevalence of international capital and
overwhelming unsustainable global economic development (Grazhevska, 2008).
Consequences of the fiscal impulses and their spread in post-communist economies demonstrate the distinctive
features which were explored in vast sources of theoretical and empirical economic literature.
The basic underlying ideas were already put forward and developed by Agenor et al. (2000), Gavin and Perotti
(1997), Alesina et al. (2008), Aslund (2012) Ilzetzki (2007), Radionova and Alimpiiev (2011) et al. The institutional
side of fiscal policy transmission mechanism in transition and low-income economies was highlighted by Mauro
(1998), King (1997), Stein (1998), Slukhai (2002).
2. Material and method
Though economic theory explores some of the aspects of macroeconomic instability and proposes certain policy
tools for advanced market economies, there exists a lack of theoretical and methodological approaches to explain the
macroeconomic deviations in transition economies. Nevertheless some of traditional macroeconomic models could
be adapted for the investigation of low-income and/or transition economies, such as e.g. Ukrainian economy. For
instance, we applied several consequences from Mundell-Fleming model to the case of Ukrainian economy as a
small open economy.
The paper widely uses comparative method with a help of which the peculiarities of fiscal policy transmission
mechanism in transition economies were revealed. Such peculiarities differ significantly from those detected in the
advanced economies. The study demonstrates that the consequences of similar fiscal impulses in developed and
developing or/and transition economies are often opposite.
While considering the consequences of government spending and taxation we applied causal method, developed
on the basis of a number of logical chains. By using logical method and comparative analysis, the authors made an
attempt to reveal the distinctiveness of transmission of the fiscal impulses in transition economies which has allowed
formulating general principles of taxation, expenditures, and management of government debt in Ukrainian
economy.
When applying statistical analysis to reveal distinctive features of Ukrainian economy we used a number of time
series from 2000 to 2012, such as: the volume of the costs of detected offenses and inefficient use of public funds,
Consumer Expectation Index, public spending of State and Consolidated budgets, State and local budgets
expenditure share in GDP, and intergovernmental transfers. The empirical basis of the study consists of the number
of reports and statistical issues of governmental organizations and research institutes. The detailed statistical analysis
outlines the key trends of Ukrainian public finances for the period of 2000 – 2012 and highlights some of the
specific features of the Ukrainian fiscal policy transmission mechanism.
Some resolutions of The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and Ukrainian government were analyzed to reveal the
distortions in implementation of national fiscal policy.
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3. Results
Conceptually we think that the peculiarity of fiscal adjustment of post-communist economies is defined by the
following institutional factors:
• Negative expectations of economic agents regarding the future.
• Rent-seeking behavior of government bodies.
• Loss of social capital, lack of trust in government.
• Ineffective structure of national economies, including public finance sector.
• High macroeconomic risks (e.g. sensitivity to external shocks).
In such a context it is essential to recognize that expectations of economic actors (generally pessimistic) along
with a low trust in government play a crucial role in transition economies. Expansionary fiscal policy has a
restrictive effect on the level of gross output in case of the crisis of confidence in government regarding its intentions
to reduce public deficit and ensure debt repayment.
According to empirical evidences presented by Ilzetzki (2010), in developing countries, the reaction of output to
increases in government consumption is reverse. Ilzetzki (2010) claims that in developing countries output increases
in response to the shock in government consumption only with a lag (of 2 to 4 quarters) and the cumulative response
of output is not statistically different from zero. Fiscal policy in developing countries not only has a distinctive effect
on the economy, but also differs in the ways of its implementation as increases in government consumption are far
more transient (dying out after approximately 6 quarters), in contrast to highly persistent government consumption
shocks in high-income countries.
Contrary to the case of advanced economies, in transition economies the classical income tax channel is non-
functional. Thus, increasing the tax rate (t) and correspondingly reducing the income after taxation (Y ̢ T)
encourages employees to shorten labour supply (LS): t (Y – T) LS Y.
The distinction of this mechanism in transition economies can be explained by the fact that revenue growth and
increase in leisure time are not substitutable for individuals with extremely low incomes. Hence, as a result of an
increase in labour taxes, the reduced income of economic agent whose propensity to consume tends to be high would
not reduce labour supply in the market, but on the contrary, will increase its labour supply and ensure autonomous
consumption. The increase in labour supply in the market will lead to a decline in real wages. Consequently, the
fiscal impulse in transition economies goes through the channel of direct taxation and along a path: t (Y – T)
LS  W.
It is difficult to determine the impact of this impulse on output (Y) due to the evident contradiction: on the one
hand, the increase in labour supply contributes to economic growth; on the other hand, the diminishing marginal
labour productivity and inefficient use of tax revenues, inherent in transition economic systems, reduce this positive
effect.
Analysis of the response of the ten post-socialist countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania) to the global financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, carried out by Aslund
(2012), shoved that reduction of the government expenditures due to administrative reforms had a positive impact on
the economies of this countries in the post-crisis period. Despite an evident theoretical sensitivity of every economic
system to an increase in government expenditures which is usually stronger than to a reduction of tax burden,
transition economies experienced positive effects from cutback of government expenditures as the misuse of state
funds diminishes too. Administrative reforms with severe cuts in the state apparatus turned out to be surprisingly
politically easy, because the most people wanted fewer bureaucrats and less bureaucracy. According to Aslund
(2012) such a change can lead to a collapse of the bureaucracy, and thus to the bolstering of business environment,
favor employment and stimulate economic growth.
In a world in which governments do not always act in their citizens’ best interests, corrupt politicians may be
expected to spend more public resources on those items on which it is easier to levy large bribes and maintain them
secret. There is a clear evidence of a negative signicant robust relationship between corruption and government
expenditure. That’s why, as suggested by Mauro (1998), before examining the specific features of the transmission
mechanism of fiscal policy in transition economies, it is essential to consider ineffective governance as a result of the
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negative externalities of the public sector, low governmental efficiency, public spending and investment
productivity.
Thus, the inefficiency of public sector can take many forms as e.g. salary costs of unproductive (unfair)
employees and ghost workers (Governance and Public Sector Management, 2013). Ineffective public expenditures
also occur in the case when the expenditures do not fulfill their initial goals. As for corruption and bribery, they
significantly diminish the factor productivity and discourage investment activity.
Therefore, institutional factors exert a significant impact on the effective functioning of the transmission
mechanism of fiscal policy in transition economies. Despite the fact that the positive structure of public expenditures
and revenues, that indicates the fiscal impulses, reflects the needs of macroeconomic system, the transmission
mechanism of these impulses do not operate properly due to the number of institutional obstacles.
It is generally known that the institutional arrangement of the Ukrainian transition economy started from
constructing the formal market institutions based on the borrowing strategy. The emergency of the changes resulted
in an institutional imbalance, appearance of a number of anomalies and dysfunctions which became an obstacle to an
effective implementation of market reforms.
According to the modern academic researchers, “an institutional inadequacy” of the Ukrainian state is related to
the lack of a long-term strategy of socio-economic transformation, when the decision making process takes place
under pressure of influence groups. Some desultory formal changes in Ukraine’s public finances were performed
without taking into consideration existing informal constraints and institutional complementarity.
The institutional environment that was established in the Ukrainian economy exhibits the following features: (1)
inability to provide a clear structuring of interactions among economic agents and the minimization of transaction
costs; (2) lack of trust which causes narrowing of the economic planning horizons of economic actors and their
“investment myopia”; (3) dominance of the bureaucratic oligarchy, lack of the real democracy and public control
over the government; (4) high corruption of bureaucrats and convergence of the state with a shadow economy; (5)
institutionalization of the shadow economy and its transformation into a stable element of the economic system,
intertwined with legal economic activities.
In our opinion, the most influential and impeding institutional factors which set conditions for the ineffective
functioning of the transmission mechanism of Ukrainian fiscal policy are: inefficient government management (in
particular expenditure management), negative expectations of economic agents and low level of decentralization of
budget process.
In this context, it is essential to acknowledge that the structure of the Ukraine’s state budget is far from perfect as
more than 90% of the Ukraine’s State budget consists of the protected items (the items which amount cannot be
changed during the reduction of approved budget allocations) as stated in the research of The Committee for
Economic Reforms (2009). Inability of the expenditures to adapt flexibly reduces the resistance of the economic
system to endogenous and exogenous shocks and increases the threat of economic crises. A number of scientists
such as e.g Zapatrina (2007), Geyets et al. (2004) confirm that noticeable shortcomings in the process of budget
planning and its implementation stay on the way of efficient functioning of the fiscal policy transmission mechanism
in Ukrainian economy.
According to the report of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, the volume of the costs of detected offenses and
inefficient use of public funds have steadily increased by 2010 and reached 23.4 billion USD in 2011 (see fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. The volume of detected offences costs and inefficient use of public funds during 2002 – 2012, billion USD
Source: Accounting Chamber of Ukraine
The analysis shows that the key factors of unproductive functioning of expenditure channel of fiscal policy
transmission mechanism in Ukrainian economy are: (1) inefficient use of public funds and revenue losses caused by
unreasonable decision-making, (2) lack of the sound social and economic forecasting and planning system, (3)
inefficient use of foreign loans and state budget special funds, etc.
It is important to note that the information asymmetry of the budget process and the incomplete disclosure of the
public finances in the Ukrainian economy bring about negative expectations of economic agents that impair the
dynamics of real macroeconomic indicators.
This notion is supported by International Centre for Policy Studies which is one of Ukraine’s top independent
research institutes aimed to promote reforms, democratic principles of government, and social transformations in
Ukraine on the basis of European integration. ICPS is one of key developers of Consumer Confidence Index which
we used to measure consumers’ expectations.
In Ukraine the survey on the Consumer Confidence Index is conducted by phone with a respondents of over
1,000 individuals aged 15–59. The questions have economic and social character and are aimed at the expected
dynamics of consumer price indexes, general and personal financial positions etc. The Index lies in a range of 0- 200
where 200 implies that all citizens evaluate the economic situation as beneficial. The Index is equal to 100 when the
shares of positive and negative expectations are alike and is less than 100 when there is a prevalence of negative
responses.
As fig. 2 shows, the most pessimistic expectations of economic actors with an index value of 53.9 were registered
in Ukraine in late 2008. The expectations have been improving for the next two years and reached their previous
level in 2010. We assume that these fluctuations are consistent with a business cycle. Thus it can not affect real
economic indicators such as private consumption and investment. Moreover the criteria for a designing of a set of
anti-crisis measures was not defined.
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Fig. 2. Consumer Expectation Index in Ukrainian economy during 2000 – 2012
Source: GfK Ukraine; International Center for Policy Studies
Hence, the level of decentralization of intergovernmental relations should be thoroughly scrutinized while
acknowledging that institutional structure of public spending is the key indicator of decentralization depth. Table 1
demonstrates the institutional structure of public spending in Ukraine during the period of 2000-2012.
Not surprisingly, analysis of the government income and expenditures, as well as the study of consolidated state
Ukraine’s budget confirm the low level of decentralization of public finances. Such a conclusion is derived from
examining the institutional structure of public spending in Ukraine during the 2000-2012 period that was provided
by Budget Code (2010) (see Table 1).
Table 1. Institutional structure dynamics of public spending in Ukraine during 2000-2012
Period
Mln hryvnia Part in consolidated budget
State budget Local budgets State budget Local budgets
2000 35532,6 12616,0 0,738 0,262
2001 40407,1 15120,9 0,728 0,272
2002 44348,2 15970,7 0,735 0,265
2003 56120,0 19672,5 0,740 0,260
2004 79471,5 21944,0 0,784 0,216
2005 112975,9 28722,9 0,797 0,203
2006 137108,0 38176,3 0,782 0,218
2007 174254,3 51800,1 0,771 0,229
2008 241454,5 67761,8 0,781 0,219
2009 242437,2 64962,2 0,789 0,211
2010 303588,7 74254,1 0,803 0,197
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2011 333414,5 83195,5 0,800 0,200
2012 395682,0 96773,0 0,803 0,197
Source: Institute for Budgetary and Socio-Economic Research; Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade of Ukraine; International Center for Policy Studies
As the table 1 shows, during the recent years the institutional structure of public spending in Ukraine has changed
slightly in the direction of centralization. In 2000, 26.2% of expenditures were accrued to the local budgets, though
in 2012 – only 19.7%. We support King’s (1997) opinion that this trend tends to destabilize national economy, while
the decentralization of public spending favors an increase in governmental efficiency.
For instance, in the USA almost 50% of government expenditures were financed by local budgets. But according
to Stein (1998) the average index for developed countries is about 30%.
Fig. 3. State and local budgets expenditure share in GDP of Ukraine, 2000 – 2012
Source: Institute for Budgetary and Socio-Economic Research; Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine; International Center
for Policy Studies
To explore our issue it is essential to study the shares of public spending financed by state and local budgets (see
Fig. 3). The figure shows that the level of local spending in Ukraine remained relatively stable for the period of 2000
– 2012. At the same time, the dynamics of state expenditures has a strong counter-cyclical character: after the
beginning of economic growth in 2000 there was a decrease of local budgets’ share in GDP, but after the global
financial crisis in 2008 the expenditure share of the state in GDP had a positive dynamics.
Herewith, according to Slukhai (2002), it is necessary to take into consideration numerous studies that prove that
the expenditure policy of local authorities in developing countries often contradicts the actions of the central
government: the central government reacts counter-cyclically, while the local government – pro-cyclically.
Nevertheless, the research did not reveal a clearly expressed counter- or pro-cyclical dynamics of Ukrainian local
budgets. In these circumstances it is impossible to reach a definite conclusion about the consequences of increasing
the fiscal autonomy of local governments. However, in a situation where local governments tend to act counter-
cyclically, it will promote the fiscal impulse transmission, and vice versa: in a case of pro-cyclical nature of local
spending the transmission of fiscal impulse could come across obstacles.
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Thus, decentralization has contradictory effects on economy. On the one hand, increased decentralization
complicates the transmission of financial impulses. On the other hand, as numerous studies prove, decentralization
has a positive impact on economy as a whole, which, evidently, is crucial. According to researches, an increase in
financial autonomy of local governments in the developing world always has a more positive impact than in
developed economies.
While exploring the peculiarities of Ukrainian fiscal policy transmission mechanism under macroeconomic
instability it is essential to take into consideration that a share of intergovernmental transfers increased in the
structure of State budget expenditures during 2007 – 2012 from 26% to 31% (see Table 2). The analysis shows that
fiscal autonomy of Ukrainian local governments reduces, while the global trend in the fiscal autonomy increases.
Table 2. Intergovernmental transfers in the structure of State budget expenditures during 2007 – 2012
Period 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Expenditures, mln hryvnia
including: 174235,9 241454,5 242437,2 303588,7 333459,5 395661,8
Intergovernmental transfers, mln
hryvnia 44655,0 59113,6 62180,1 77766,2 94875,0 124459,6
Intergovernmental transfers share in
total expenditures 0,26 0,24 0,26 0,26 0,28 0,31
Source: Institute for Budgetary and Socio-Economic Research; Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine
This trend does not confirm the notions of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On the budget
policy for 2013” which provides:
• implementation of gradual transfer of some government expenditures to local budgets (including expenditures on
government measures and subsidies of State budget). The local governments should put these measures into a
practice along with the simultaneous government funding for such expenditures;
• increase in the share of local budgets in the Consolidated Budget along with the strengthening of the basic social
standards, enlargement of investment resources, functional redistribution between the center and the regions, and
adoption of structural reforms;
• develop methodological principles of planning of local budgets in the middle run term;
• increase in the level and effectiveness of the management of budget funds through the gradual introduction in the
budget process of program-target method at the local budgets, etc.
4. Discussion
Effects of fiscal policy transmission mechanism were highlighted within at least two research paradigms –
neoclassical (A. Hansen, J. Hicks) and Keynesian (J. M. Keynes, G. Mankiw, R. Mundell).
Keynesians claim that fiscal policy can have strong effect on aggregate demand, output and employment when
the economy is operating below full capacity of national output, and where there is a need to provide a demand-
stimulus to the economy.
In contrast to the Keynesian approach, monetarist economists insist that government spending and changes in
taxation can have only a temporary effect on aggregate demand, output and employment. They claim that monetary
policy is a more effective instrument for controlling demand and inflation and reject fiscal policy as a
countercyclical measure.
The research reveals that the key peculiarity of fiscal policy in transition economies is its procyclical nature that
makes oscillation amplitude of business activity deeper. Such a notion was proven by a number of researchers.
Agenor (2000) as well as Gavin and Perotti (1997) explored the reasons why the main part of revealed links between
fiscal policy and real and monetary sectors that can be found in developed market economies, are disrupted in post-
communist economies.
Alesina et al. (2008) made an attempt to reveal the logic of why fiscal policy, called to stabilize national
economy, and hence to smooth business cycles in low-income countries often turn out to be procyclical. Ilzetzki
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(2007) explained why such institutional factors as rent-seeking behavior in government sector trigger
macroeconomic distortions through procyclical character of fiscal regulation.
Radionova and Alimpiiev (2011) discovered that the transition economies suffer from shock responses to fiscal
impulses. Such a severe reaction often makes governmental policy partly or completely ineffective. Geyets et al.
(2004) highlighted the modern trends in intergovernmental relations development and its peculiarities in transition
economies.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents specific features of the fiscal policy transmission mechanism in the Ukrainian economy while
acknowledging its transitional character and high level of macroeconomic instability.
The key factor that determines the characteristics of the fiscal policy transmission mechanism in the national
economy is, according to the conducted analysis, effectiveness of public management.
We revealed the unclear public finances of national economy leads to negative expectations of economic agents
that deteriorate the dynamics of key macroeconomic indicators.
We find that Ukraine has a destructive institutional environment, resulting in an economy’s transition to a so-
called “institutional trap” in which rejection of informal interactions prevents its current functioning. At the same
time, the shadow economy undermines the possibility of long-term economic growth. Added to this is the presence
of persistent behavioral stereotypes of economic actors formed under command economy, the development of
institutional mechanisms for their rent-seeking behavior, unsystematic and contradictory legislation etc.
In these circumstances, an economic revitalization of Ukrainian state has a prior importance. Sound fiscal policy
should be designed to make effective institutional reforms aimed at a clear specification of property rights,
transparent and obvious “game rules” for all economic actors, a favorable business climate establishment, the same
rival conditions setting out, sustainable and efficient financial institutions and organizations launching.
The future researches in this field should define the effective channels and tools of Ukrainian fiscal policy
transmission mechanism that will improve fiscal and budgeting processes in Ukrainian economy.
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